Weighted representative democracy
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Publication:2178584
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2020.03.001zbMATH Open1437.91193OpenAlexW3010843384MaRDI QIDQ2178584FDOQ2178584
Authors: Marcus Pivato, Arnold Soh
Publication date: 11 May 2020
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.03.001
Recommendations
judgement aggregationsocial choicepreference aggregationrepresentative democracybinary decisionweighted majority voting
Cites Work
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- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Binary voting with delegable proxy: an analysis of liquid democracy
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- Tournament solutions
- Weighted tournament solutions
Cited In (12)
- Democratically elected aristocracies
- On the Impact of Vote Delegation
- A note on the direct democracy deficit in two-tier voting
- The pros and cons of democracy
- Social insurance with representative democracy
- Representatives and districts
- One person, one weight: when is weighted voting democratic?
- Consistent representative democracy
- Weighted approval voting
- Heights of representative systems: A proof of Fishburn's conjecture
- Approximately dominating representatives
- Representative committees of peers
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