Judgments aggregation by a sequential majority procedure

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2018.06.004MaRDI QIDQ1737124zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Bezalel Peleg, Shmuel Zamir

Publication date 26 March 2019

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.06.004

zbMATH Keywords

plurality votingjudgment aggregationsequential majority procedure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• The Condorcet set: majority voting over interconnected propositions
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Cites work

• A characterization result for the plurality rule
• Aggregation of binary evaluations
• Aggregation theory and the relevance of some issues to others
• Arrow's theorem in judgment aggregation
• Characterizations of the plurality function
• Judgment aggregation without full rationality
• Scoring rules for judgment aggregation
• Social Choice Scoring Functions
• The theory of judgment aggregation: an introductory review

Cited in

(4)

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5543094 (Why is no real title available?)
• The Condorcet set: majority voting over interconnected propositions
• Sequential composition of voting rules in multi-issue domains
• How indeterminate is sequential majority voting? A judgement aggregation perspective

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