A characterization result for the plurality rule
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Publication:1258676
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(78)90108-4zbMath0408.90012OpenAlexW2092213113MaRDI QIDQ1258676
Publication date: 1978
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(78)90108-4
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