Voting operators in the space of choice functions
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Publication:1079455
DOI10.1016/0165-4896(86)90027-2zbMath0597.90006OpenAlexW2151580133MaRDI QIDQ1079455
M. A. Aĭzerman, Fuad T. Aleskerov
Publication date: 1986
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170918-132850289
monotonicitysocial choicechoice functionscentral regionLocal voting operatorsmutual exclusive neutralitiesneutrality to variantsnon-imposedness
Related Items (11)
Limits on power and rationality ⋮ A comment on Arrow's impossibility theorem ⋮ Arrowian social equilibrium: indecisiveness, influence and rational social choices under majority rule ⋮ Axiomatic characterizations of voting operators ⋮ Collectively rational voting rules for simple preferences ⋮ Implementation of voting operators ⋮ The history of social choice in Russia and the Soviet Union ⋮ Arrowian characterizations of latticial federation consensus functions ⋮ On dynamic aggregation systems ⋮ Impossibility results for choice correspondences ⋮ Functional voting operators: The non-monotonic case
Cites Work
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- Representations of binary decision rules by generalized decisiveness structures
- Decomposition of choice functions into a system of simpler functions
- The Arrow paradox in group choice theory (analysis of the problem)
- Local operators in models of social choice
- Some aspects of the general theory of best option choice
- A characterization result for the plurality rule
- Nonbinary Social Choice: An Impossibility Theorem
- Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice
- Path-Independent Social Choice Functions: A Further Result
- Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination
- Some Further Results on Consistency, Rationality and Collective Choice
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