Scoring rules: an alternative parameterization

DOI10.1007/S00199-005-0049-3MaRDI QIDQ852338zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Eyal Baharad, Shmuel Nitzan

Publication date 29 November 2006

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0049-3

zbMATH Keywords

Minimal size of veto coalitionParameterizationScore-expansion propertyScoring rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Scoring rules and social choice properties: some characterizations
• The inverse plurality rule-an axiomatization
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Cites work

• A characterization result for the plurality rule
• A simple characterization of plurality rule
• The Borda dictionary
• The inverse plurality rule-an axiomatization

Cited in

(13)

• An Overview of Applications of Proper Scoring Rules
• The costs of implementing the majority principle: The golden voting rule
• Borda's paradox with weighted scoring rules
• Scoring rules and the evaluation of probabilities. (With discussion)
• Internal slackening scoring methods
• Scoring rules: a cooperative game-theoretic approach
• Characterising scoring rules by their solution in iteratively undominated strategies
• Violations of Reversal Symmetry Under Simple and Runoff Scoring Rules
• A new example for a proper scoring rule
• Consistency of scoring rules: a reinvestigation of composition-consistency
• Symmetric and asymmetric committees
• Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: consistency and paradoxes
• Compatible weighted proper scoring rules

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