The informational basis of scoring rules
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Publication:905166
Recommendations
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
- A characterization for qualified majority voting rules
- A characterization of simple majority rule for restricted domains
- A graphical analysis of some basic results in social choice
- A new characterization of the majority rule
- A simple characterization of majority rule
- Another characterization of the majority rule.
- Approval voting and Arrow's impossibility theorem
- Condorcet Social Choice Functions
- Equity and the Informational Basis of Collective Choice
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Maskin monotonic aggregation rules
- On the informational basis of social choice
- Social choice and individual values
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Tournament solutions and majority voting
- Weighted approval voting
Cited in
(10)
- Scoring rules for judgment aggregation
- Negative voting social welfare functions: a characterization
- Scoring rules and consensus
- Scoring rules: an alternative parameterization
- A general concept of scoring rules: general definitions, statistical inference, and empirical illustrations
- Condorcet efficiency, information costs, and the performance of scoring rules
- Scoring rules and social choice properties: some characterizations
- Point score systems and football coaching secrecy
- A general scoring rule
- An Overview of Applications of Proper Scoring Rules
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