A general scoring rule
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Publication:433802
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2012.01.006zbMATH Open1243.91036OpenAlexW2054586910MaRDI QIDQ433802FDOQ433802
Publication date: 6 July 2012
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.01.006
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Cites Work
- Social choice and individual values
- Positionalist voting functions
- Relative Utilitarianism
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Social Choice Scoring Functions
- Axiomatic derivation of scoring rules without the ordering assumption
- Consistency without neutrality in voting rules: When is a vote an average?
- Framed Field Experiments on Approval Voting: Lessons from the 2002 and 2007 French Presidential Elections
- A Characterization of Societies with Consistent Majority Decision
- A Theorem on Utilitarianism
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- The Borda majority count
- A theory of measuring, electing, and ranking
Cited In (14)
- Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections
- Some regrettable grading scale effects under different versions of evaluative voting
- Dilemma with approval and disapproval votes
- Regles positionnelles iteratives, principe majoritaire et preferences unimodales
- The wisdom of collective grading and the effects of epistemic and semantic diversity
- The Borda majority count
- Voting with evaluations: characterizations of evaluative voting and range voting
- Formal utilitarianism and range voting
- Dis\&approval voting: a characterization
- An Arrovian impossibility in combining ranking and evaluation
- Evaluationwise strategy-proofness
- A new example for a proper scoring rule
- Evaluating competing theories via a common language of qualitative verdicts
- Variable-population voting rules
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