A general scoring rule

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2012.01.006MaRDI QIDQ433802zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Wulf Gaertner, Yongsheng Xu

Publication date 6 July 2012

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.01.006

zbMATH Keywords

scoringvoting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3854738 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3630438 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Characterization of Societies with Consistent Majority Decision
• A Theorem on Utilitarianism
• A theory of measuring, electing, and ranking
• Axiomatic derivation of scoring rules without the ordering assumption
• Consistency without neutrality in voting rules: When is a vote an average?
• Framed Field Experiments on Approval Voting: Lessons from the 2002 and 2007 French Presidential Elections
• Positionalist voting functions
• Relative Utilitarianism
• Social Choice Scoring Functions
• Social choice and individual values
• The Borda majority count

Cited in

(18)

• Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections
• Axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules
• Some regrettable grading scale effects under different versions of evaluative voting
• Dilemma with approval and disapproval votes
• Regles positionnelles iteratives, principe majoritaire et preferences unimodales
• The wisdom of collective grading and the effects of epistemic and semantic diversity
• The Borda majority count
• Voting with evaluations: characterizations of evaluative voting and range voting
• Formal utilitarianism and range voting
• Dis\&approval voting: a characterization
• Scoring rules and social choice properties: some characterizations
• An Arrovian impossibility in combining ranking and evaluation
• Scoring indices, top-truncated preferences, and splitting invariance
• Evaluationwise strategy-proofness
• A new example for a proper scoring rule
• Evaluating competing theories via a common language of qualitative verdicts
• Variable-population voting rules
• An axiomatic characterization of the Slater rule

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