Regles positionnelles iteratives, principe majoritaire et preferences unimodales

DOI10.1051/ro:2000118zbMath1006.91029OpenAlexW2113640815MaRDI QIDQ4528239

Dominique Lepelley, Laurent Vidu

Publication date: 31 January 2001

Published in: RAIRO - Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://eudml.org/doc/197808

zbMATH Keywords

social choiceCondorcet winnerscoring rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

A note on scoring rules that respect majority in choice and elimination.

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