Regles positionnelles iteratives, principe majoritaire et preferences unimodales

DOI10.1051/RO:2000118MaRDI QIDQ4528239zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dominique Lepelley, Laurent Vidu

Publication date 31 January 2001

Published in RAIRO - Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://eudml.org/doc/197808

zbMATH Keywords

scoring rulesCondorcet winnersocial choice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Constant scoring rules, Condorcet criteria and single-peaked preferences
• Condorcet consistent scoring rules and single-peakedness
• Positional rules and \(q\)-Condorcet consistency
• The scoring rules in an endogenous election
• A general scoring rule

Cited in

(5)

• A note on scoring rules that respect majority in choice and elimination.
• Scoring rules cannot respect majority in choice and elimination simultaneously
• Preference fusion when the number of alternatives exceeds two: Indirect scoring procedures
• Positional rules and \(q\)-Condorcet consistency
• Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: consistency and paradoxes

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