Condorcet consistent scoring rules and single-peakedness
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Publication:2311174
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2019.05.028zbMath1418.91195OpenAlexW2946902317WikidataQ127821535 ScholiaQ127821535MaRDI QIDQ2311174
Guadalupe Correa-Lopera, Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno
Publication date: 10 July 2019
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10256/19368
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