Positionalist voting rules: a general definition and axiomatic characterizations
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Publication:2217350
DOI10.1007/s00355-019-01232-3zbMath1454.91071OpenAlexW2994931429WikidataQ126587916 ScholiaQ126587916MaRDI QIDQ2217350
Kotaro Suzumura, Walter Bossert
Publication date: 29 December 2020
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-019-01232-3
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