Formal utilitarianism and range voting

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.08.002zbMath1285.91037MaRDI QIDQ2446693

Marcus Pivato

Publication date: 17 April 2014

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.08.002

zbMATH Keywords

axiomatic characterizations; range voting; formal utilitarian voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B12: Voting theory

Related Items

Variable-population voting rules, Evaluating competing theories via a common language of qualitative verdicts, Voting with evaluations: characterizations of evaluative voting and range voting, An Arrovian impossibility in combining ranking and evaluation, On the Condorcet efficiency of evaluative voting (and other voting rules) with trichotomous preferences, Some regrettable grading scale effects under different versions of evaluative voting, Utilitarianism without individual utilities

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