Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2247953
DOI10.1007/s00355-013-0728-0zbMath1291.91066MaRDI QIDQ2247953
Jean-François Laslier, Matías Núñez
Publication date: 30 June 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0728-0
91B12: Voting theory
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