Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections

DOI10.1007/S00355-013-0728-0MaRDI QIDQ2247953zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Matías Núñez, Jean-François Laslier

Publication date 30 June 2014

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0728-0

zbMATH Keywords

strategic votingvoting equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• A general scoring rule
• A note on the tight simplification of mechanisms
• A theory of voting in large elections
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
• Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
• Framed Field Experiments on Approval Voting: Lessons from the 2002 and 2007 French Presidential Elections
• Handbook on approval voting
• Impartiality: Definition and Representation
• Interpretation of electoral mixed strategies
• Large Poisson games
• On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules
• One person, many votes: divided majority and information aggregation
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Relative Utilitarianism
• Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions
• Social Choice Scoring Functions
• Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule

Cited in

(11)

• Voting with evaluations: characterizations of evaluative voting and range voting
• A stylized model of overrepresentation and quality in the congress
• Characterising scoring rules by their solution in iteratively undominated strategies
• Some regrettable grading scale effects under different versions of evaluative voting
• Strategic voting in heterogeneous electorates: an experimental study
• Formal utilitarianism and range voting
• The strategic sincerity of approval voting
• Trimming extreme reports in preference aggregation
• Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules
• Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization
• A general impossibility theorem on Pareto efficiency and Bayesian incentive compatibility

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