An axiomatic characterization of the Slater rule
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Publication:2235101
DOI10.1007/S00355-020-01305-8zbMATH Open1471.91094OpenAlexW3120871728MaRDI QIDQ2235101FDOQ2235101
Authors: Burak Can, Mohsen Pourpouneh, Ton Storcken
Publication date: 20 October 2021
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/77356491/Can_2021_An_Axiomatic_Re_characterization_of_the.pdf
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Cites Work
- On the complexity of Slater's problems
- Condorcet Social Choice Functions
- A Consistent Extension of Condorcet’s Election Principle
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Update monotone preference rules
- Social Choice Scoring Functions
- The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
- Transitive closure, proximity and intransitivities
- Choosing from a tournament
- Preference Proximity and Anonymous Social Choice
- The Dodgson ranking and its relation to Kemeny's method and Slater's rule
- Slater's winners of a tournament may not be in the Banks set
- Measuring intransitivity
- Tournament solutions
- A re-characterization of the Kemeny distance
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