Consistency without neutrality in voting rules: When is a vote an average?

DOI10.1016/j.mcm.2008.05.031zbMath1187.91055OpenAlexW2015676433MaRDI QIDQ2389767

William S. Zwicker

Publication date: 18 July 2009

Published in: Mathematical and Computer Modelling (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mcm.2008.05.031

zbMATH Keywords

decompositiontiesconvexscoring ruleconnectedvoting systemconsistentVoronoihyperplane separationgeneralized scoring rulegeometry of votingmean neat rulemean proximity rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

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