Distance rationalization of anonymous and homogeneous voting rules
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Publication:2417418
DOI10.1007/s00355-018-1156-yzbMath1410.91203arXiv1610.01900OpenAlexW3122138868WikidataQ129082313 ScholiaQ129082313MaRDI QIDQ2417418
Benjamin Hadjibeyli, Mark C. Wilson
Publication date: 12 June 2019
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1610.01900
Wasserstein metrichomogeneitysocial choice theoryrankingssimplexcollective decision-makinganonymityKantorovich distanceEarth mover distance
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Cites Work
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