In the context of constitutional design, a committee of citizens' representatives proposes (social choice) axioms. The outcome should not necessarily be the aggregation rule, or rules, satisfying each of the axioms. Alternative procedures are recommended for aggregating a set of axioms into a single summary axiom. The summary axiom generates a single social decision function when a social metric is applied.
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Cites work
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Cited in
(8)- Monotonicity-based consensus states for the monometric rationalisation of ranking rules and how they are affected by ties
- Distance rationalization of anonymous and homogeneous voting rules
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