Social compromise and social metrics
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Publication:1083992
DOI10.1007/BF00433520zbMATH Open0605.90013MaRDI QIDQ1083992FDOQ1083992
Authors: Shmuel Nitzan, Donald E. Campbell 
Publication date: 1986
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
- The median procedure in cluster analysis and social choice theory
- Social choice and individual values
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- Approaches to the Bargaining Problem Before and After the Theory of Games: A Critical Discussion of Zeuthen's, Hicks', and Nash's Theories
- On Nicely Consistent Voting Systems
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Cited In (7)
- Demystifying the `metric approach to social compromise with the unanimity criterion'
- Metric rationalization of social welfare functions
- Level \(r\) consensus and stable social choice
- Distance rationalization of anonymous and homogeneous voting rules
- Monotonicity-based consensus states for the monometric rationalisation of ranking rules and how they are affected by ties
- Approximating optimal social choice under metric preferences
- Distance rationalization of voting rules
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