Approaches to the Bargaining Problem Before and After the Theory of Games: A Critical Discussion of Zeuthen's, Hicks', and Nash's Theories

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Publication:3233624


DOI10.2307/1905748zbMath0071.14008MaRDI QIDQ3233624

John C. Harsanyi

Publication date: 1956

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1905748



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