Mechanism design for automated negotiation, and its application to task oriented domains

DOI10.1016/0004-3702(95)00104-2zbMath1506.68166OpenAlexW2096737663WikidataQ127363299 ScholiaQ127363299MaRDI QIDQ2676568

Gilad Zlotkin, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

Publication date: 27 September 2022

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0004-3702(95)00104-2

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (4)

Negotiation strategies for agents with ordinal preferences: theoretical analysis and human study ⋮ Collaborative assignment using belief-desire-intention agent modeling and negotiation with speedup strategies ⋮ Bidding games and efficient allocations ⋮ Reaching agreements through argumentation: a logical model and implementation

Cites Work

• Axiomatic models of bargaining
• Multiagent negotiation under time constraints
• Compromise in negotiation: exploiting worth functions over states
• Intention is choice with commitment
• Deriving consensus in multiagent systems
• The Bargaining Problem
• Approaches to the Bargaining Problem Before and After the Theory of Games: A Critical Discussion of Zeuthen's, Hicks', and Nash's Theories
• Cooperation and conflict resolution via negotiation among autonomous agents in noncooperative domains
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