scientific article; zbMATH DE number 67467

zbMATH Open0745.68114MaRDI QIDQ4012197FDOQ4012197

Authors: Gilad Zlotkin, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein 

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Title of this publication is not available (Why is that?)

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zbMATH Keywords

planningmulti-agent systemsincomplete informationnegotiation protocolsbeneficial deception

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problem solving in the context of artificial intelligence (heuristics, search strategies, etc.) (68T20) Theory of languages and software systems (knowledge-based systems, expert systems, etc.) for artificial intelligence (68T35)

Cited In (12)

• Beliefs, time and incomplete information in multiple encounter negotiations among autonomous agents
• Rough mereological foundations for design, analysis, synthesis, and control in distributed systems
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Modelling deception using theory of mind in multi-agent systems
• Mechanism design for automated negotiation, and its application to task oriented domains
• Formalizing negotiations using logic programming
• Rough mereology: A new paradigm for approximate reasoning
• Compromise in negotiation: exploiting worth functions over states
• The case of the lying postman: Decoys and deception in negotiation.
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Deceptive updating and minimal information methods
• Fooling All of the People Some of the Time: A Theory of Endogenous Sequencing in Confidential Negotiations

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