Fooling All of the People Some of the Time: A Theory of Endogenous Sequencing in Confidential Negotiations
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Publication:4664532
DOI10.1111/j.1467-937X.2004.00307.xzbMath1103.91017OpenAlexW1524285670MaRDI QIDQ4664532
Publication date: 5 April 2005
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2004.00307.x
Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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