Assembly problems

DOI10.1007/978-981-16-4737-6_5MaRDI QIDQ5022151zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dhritiman Gupta, Soumendu Sarkar

Publication date 18 January 2022

Published in Indian Statistical Institute Series (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4737-6_5

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingasymmetric informationmechanism designcoalitionholdoutassembly problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 54098 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
• A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
• A course in game theory.
• A model of seller holdout
• A theory of endogenous coalition structures
• Bargaining orders in a multi-person bargaining game
• Bargaining under Incomplete Information
• Breakdown in multilateral negotiations
• Convergence of VCG mechanism to ex-post budget balance in a model of land acquisition
• Delay in multilateral bargaining under complete information
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Fooling All of the People Some of the Time: A Theory of Endogenous Sequencing in Confidential Negotiations
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Inefficient Markov perfect equilibria in multilateral bargaining
• Mechanism design for land acquisition
• On the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Transparency, complementarity and holdout

Cited in

(4)

• Strategyproof and budget-balanced mechanisms for assembly
• Fairness and transparency in one-to-many bargaining with complementarity: an experimental study
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3976789 (Why is no real title available?)
• Bargaining for assembly

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