Mechanism design for land acquisition
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Publication:1677251
DOI10.1007/s00182-016-0556-4zbMath1415.91145OpenAlexW2548898463MaRDI QIDQ1677251
Publication date: 10 November 2017
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-016-0556-4
Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (9)
Optimal mechanism for land acquisition ⋮ Convergence of VCG mechanism to ex-post budget balance in a model of land acquisition ⋮ Fairness and partial coercion in land assembly ⋮ Reassignment-proof rules for land rental problems ⋮ Duality in land rental problems ⋮ Cost of efficiency in trading perfect complements ⋮ Bargaining for assembly ⋮ A sequential bargaining protocol for land rental arrangements ⋮ Assembly Problems
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- The possibility of efficient mechanisms for trading an indivisible object
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- Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
- Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
- Incentives in Teams
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