Transparency, complementarity and holdout

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.01.003MaRDI QIDQ423729zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Prabal Roy Chowdhury, Kunal Sengupta

Publication date 4 June 2012

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17606/1/MPRA_paper_17606.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencytransparencycomplementarityCoase theoremholdoutmulti-person bargainingpublic offerssecret offers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 54098 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
• A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core
• A Theory of Gradual Coalition Formation
• A market to implement the core
• A model of seller holdout
• A noncooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers
• A theory of endogenous coalition structures
• Bargaining Foundations of Shapely Value
• Bargaining and Value
• Coalition Formation with Binding Agreements
• Communication and coordination in the laboratory collective resistance game
• Delay in multilateral bargaining under complete information
• Equilibrium binding agreements
• Inefficient Markov perfect equilibria in multilateral bargaining
• Multilateral Bargaining
• On the land assembly problem
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Rubinstein auctions: On competition for bargaining partners
• Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division

Cited in

(19)

• Sequential vote buying
• Holdups and holdouts: what do they have in common?
• Bargaining order and delays in multilateral bargaining with heterogeneous sellers
• Mechanism design for land acquisition
• Transparency, entry, and productivity
• Bargaining orders in a multi-person bargaining game
• Fairness and partial coercion in land assembly
• One-to-many bargaining when pairwise agreements are non-renegotiable
• Expropriation power in private dealings: quota rule in collective sales
• Breakdown in multilateral negotiations
• Hold-up in vertical hierarchies with adverse selection
• Transparency and special interests
• Optimal mechanism for land acquisition
• Collective hold‐up
• On Transparency in Organizations
• Convergence of VCG mechanism to ex-post budget balance in a model of land acquisition
• Assembly problems
• Bargaining for assembly
• A model of seller holdout

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