Transparency, complementarity and holdout
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Publication:423729
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.01.003zbMATH Open1239.91066OpenAlexW2788362626MaRDI QIDQ423729FDOQ423729
Prabal Roy Chowdhury, Kunal Sengupta
Publication date: 4 June 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17606/1/MPRA_paper_17606.pdf
Recommendations
efficiencytransparencycomplementarityCoase theoremholdoutmulti-person bargainingpublic offerssecret offers
Cites Work
- Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Bargaining and Value
- A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core
- Inefficient Markov perfect equilibria in multilateral bargaining
- Delay in multilateral bargaining under complete information
- A model of seller holdout
- On the land assembly problem
- Multilateral Bargaining
- A noncooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers
- Equilibrium binding agreements
- A theory of endogenous coalition structures
- Bargaining Foundations of Shapely Value
- A market to implement the core
- A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
- Rubinstein auctions: On competition for bargaining partners
- Communication and coordination in the laboratory collective resistance game
- A Theory of Gradual Coalition Formation
- Coalition Formation with Binding Agreements
Cited In (17)
- One-to-many bargaining when pairwise agreements are non-renegotiable
- Bargaining order and delays in multilateral bargaining with heterogeneous sellers
- Transparency and special interests
- Optimal mechanism for land acquisition
- Transparency, entry, and productivity
- Convergence of VCG mechanism to ex-post budget balance in a model of land acquisition
- Mechanism design for land acquisition
- Expropriation power in private dealings: quota rule in collective sales
- Bargaining orders in a multi-person bargaining game
- A model of seller holdout
- Breakdown in multilateral negotiations
- Collective hold‐up
- Fairness and partial coercion in land assembly
- Bargaining for assembly
- Assembly Problems
- On Transparency in Organizations
- Sequential vote buying
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