One-to-many bargaining when pairwise agreements are non-renegotiable
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Publication:403738
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2014.04.004zbMath1297.91019OpenAlexW1969680334MaRDI QIDQ403738
Publication date: 29 August 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.04.004
Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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Cites Work
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