One-to-many bargaining when pairwise agreements are non-renegotiable

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.04.004MaRDI QIDQ403738zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors João Montez

Publication date 29 August 2014

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.04.004

zbMATH Keywords

nucleolusone-to-many bargainingpairwise bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

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Cites work

• A model of seller holdout
• Bargaining Foundations of Shapely Value
• Bargaining and Value
• Bargaining, binding contracts, and competitive wages.
• Bargaining: Separately or together?
• Collusion, Exclusion, and Inclusion in Random-Order Bargaining
• Cores of convex games
• Delay in multilateral bargaining under complete information
• Does Asset Ownership Always Motivate Managers? Outside Options and the Property Rights Theory of the Firm
• Fooling All of the People Some of the Time: A Theory of Endogenous Sequencing in Confidential Negotiations
• Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
• Inefficient Markov perfect equilibria in multilateral bargaining
• Intra-Firm Bargaining under Non-Binding Contracts
• Monotonic allocation schemes in clan games
• Non-cooperative Bargaining and Union Formation
• Sequential bargaining in a market with one seller and two different buyers
• Strategic bargaining, surplus sharing problems and the nucleolus
• Transparency, complementarity and holdout
• `Hydraulic' rationing

Cited in

(7)

• One-dimensional bargaining
• Bargaining one-dimensional social choices
• Reject and renegotiate: the Shapley value in multilateral bargaining
• Hyperadditive games and applications to networks or matching problems
• Bargaining with nonanonymous disagreement: decomposable rules
• Decentralized one-to-many bargaining
• Strategic bargaining, surplus sharing problems and the nucleolus

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