Collusion, Exclusion, and Inclusion in Random-Order Bargaining

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00251zbMath1073.91003OpenAlexW2238191991MaRDI QIDQ3044087

I. R. Segal'

Publication date: 10 August 2004

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00251

zbMATH Keywords

characteristic functioncontractcolluding players

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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