Vertical syndication-proof competitive prices in multilateral assignment markets

DOI10.1007/S10058-016-0193-1MaRDI QIDQ682463zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors M. Álvarez-Mozos, Oriol Tejada

Publication date 2 February 2018

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/2445/104723

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gamenucleolusbankruptcy problemassignment marketmultilateral marketsyndicate

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cites work

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Cited in

(5)

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4006024 (Why is no real title available?)
• Symmetrically multilateral-bargained allocations in multi-sided assignment markets
• Disadvantageous syndicates and stable cartels: The case of the nucleolus
• From the bankruptcy problem and its concede-and-divide solution to the assignment problem and its fair division solution
• Monotonic core allocation paths for assignment games

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