Monotonic core allocation paths for assignment games

DOI10.1007/s00355-019-01197-3zbMath1432.91012OpenAlexW2952657158WikidataQ127724233 ScholiaQ127724233MaRDI QIDQ2296028

Shuige Liu, Takaaki Abe

Publication date: 17 February 2020

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.waseda.jp/fpse/winpec/assets/uploads/2018/11/No.E1808.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

assignment gamesmonotonic core allocation path

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (2)

Cartel formation in Cournot competition with asymmetric costs: a partition function approach ⋮ On the population monotonicity of independent set games

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Problems of fair division and the egalitarian solution
• Vertical syndication-proof competitive prices in multilateral assignment markets
• Assignment games satisfy the CoMa-property
• Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility
• Characterization of the extreme core allocations of the assignment game.
• Social integration in two-sided matching markets
• A simple procedure to obtain the extreme core allocations of an assignment market
• Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Graph Theory
• The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population
• A Concept of Egalitarianism Under Participation Constraints

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