Social integration in two-sided matching markets
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Publication:1800976
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2018.08.003zbMATH Open1416.91305arXiv1705.08033OpenAlexW3099307116WikidataQ60781771 ScholiaQ60781771MaRDI QIDQ1800976FDOQ1800976
Authors: Josué Ortega 
Publication date: 26 October 2018
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: When several two-sided matching markets merge into one, it is inevitable that some agents will become worse off if the matching mechanism used is stable. I formalize this observation by defining the property of integration monotonicity, which requires that every agent becomes better off after any number of matching markets merge. Integration monotonicity is also incompatible with the weaker efficiency property of Pareto optimality. Nevertheless, I obtain two possibility results. First, stable matching mechanisms never hurt more than one-half of the society after the integration of several matching markets occurs. Second, in random matching markets there are positive expected gains from integration for both sides of the market, which I quantify.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1705.08033
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- School choice with independent versus consolidated districts
- Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: a topological approach
- Democratic fair allocation of indivisible goods
- The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice
- Matching markets and cultural selection
- Stability in matching markets with peer effects
- Monotonic core allocation paths for assignment games
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