Free riding and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange
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Publication:4585993
DOI10.3982/TE1357zbMATH Open1395.91337OpenAlexW2125010663MaRDI QIDQ4585993FDOQ4585993
Publication date: 11 September 2018
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te1357
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Cited In (18)
- Altruistically unbalanced kidney exchange
- On the integration of Shapley-Scarf markets
- Mix and match: a strategyproof mechanism for multi-hospital kidney exchange
- A theoretical and computational equilibria analysis of a multi-player kidney exchange program
- Social integration in two-sided matching markets
- Short trading cycles: paired kidney exchange with strict ordinal preferences
- The losses from integration in matching markets can be large
- How (not) to integrate blood subtyping technology to kidney exchange
- Adapting a kidney exchange algorithm to align with human values
- Design and analysis of multi-hospital kidney exchange mechanisms using random graphs
- Rejection-proof mechanisms for multi-agent kidney exchange
- IP solutions for international kidney exchange programmes
- Ignorance Is Almost Bliss: Near-Optimal Stochastic Matching with Few Queries
- On Matching and Thickness in Heterogeneous Dynamic Markets
- Maximising expectation of the number of transplants in kidney exchange programmes
- Nash equilibria in the two-player kidney exchange game
- Identifying optimal strategies in kidney exchange games is \(\varSigma_2^p\)-complete
- Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange
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