The losses from integration in matching markets can be large

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2018.10.028zbMATH Open1422.91557arXiv1810.10287OpenAlexW2896639702WikidataQ60781772 ScholiaQ60781772MaRDI QIDQ2328512FDOQ2328512

Josué Ortega

Publication date: 10 October 2019

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: Although the integration of two-sided matching markets using stable mechanisms generates expected gains from integration, I show that there are worst-case scenarios in which these are negative. The losses from integration can be large enough that the average rank of an agent's spouse decreases by 37.5% of the length of their preference list in any stable matching mechanism.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1810.10287

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zbMATH Keywords

social integrationassignment schemeslarge matching marketsreplica economiesspouse ranking

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

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Cited In (5)

• Fairness and efficiency in cake-cutting with single-peaked preferences
• On the integration of Shapley-Scarf markets
• Gainers and losers from market integration
• Equality of opportunity and integration in social networks
• The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice

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