Matching with aggregate externalities

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2016.03.001MaRDI QIDQ277295zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors James C. D. Fisher, Isa E. Hafalir

Publication date 4 May 2016

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.03.001

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
• A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues
• Beauty Is a Beast, Frog Is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
• On a characterization of stable matchings
• Stability and preference alignment in matching and coalition formation
• Stability of marriage with externalities
• Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
• Stable matchings and preferences of couples
• Stable one-to-one matchings with externalities
• Two-sided matching problems with externalities

Cited in

(19)

• Labor market matching with ensuing competitive externalities in large economies
• Downstream competition and upstream labor market matching
• Pairwise stable matching in large economies
• Stability of marriage with externalities
• Two-sided matching with externalities: a survey
• Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples
• Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities
• Stability and median rationalizability for aggregate matchings
• The assignment game with negative externalities and bounded rationality
• The roommate problem with externalities
• Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
• The losses from integration in matching markets can be large
• Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: a topological approach
• Assortative matching with externalities and farsighted agents
• Stable matching in large markets with occupational choice
• Matching with Externalities
• Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences
• Strategic issues in one-to-one matching with externalities
• Matching with externalities: the role of prudence and social connectedness in stability

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