Matching with aggregate externalities (Q277295)

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Language	Label	Description	Also known as
English	Matching with aggregate externalities	scientific article

Statements

scholarly article

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Matching with aggregate externalities (English)

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James C. D. Fisher

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Mathematical Social Sciences

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publication date

4 May 2016

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MaRDI profile type

MaRDI publication profile

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full work available at URL

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.03.001

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On a characterization of stable matchings

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Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms

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Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues

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A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues

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A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications

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College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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Stability of marriage with externalities

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Stable matchings and preferences of couples

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Beauty Is a Beast, Frog Is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities

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Stable one-to-one matchings with externalities

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Stability and Preference Alignment in Matching and Coalition Formation

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Two-sided matching problems with externalities

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Identifiers

zbMATH Open document ID

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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zbMATH DE Number

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10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2016.03.001

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Sitelinks

Mathematics(1 entry)

mardi Publication:277295

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