Matching with aggregate externalities

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.03.001zbMath1347.91204OpenAlexW2297646760MaRDI QIDQ277295

Isa E. Hafalir, James C. D. Fisher

Publication date: 4 May 2016

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.03.001

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (10)

Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities ⋮ Assortative matching with externalities and farsighted agents ⋮ Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences ⋮ Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: a topological approach ⋮ Matching with externalities: the role of prudence and social connectedness in stability ⋮ Labor market matching with ensuing competitive externalities in large economies ⋮ The roommate problem with externalities ⋮ Downstream competition and upstream labor market matching ⋮ Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples ⋮ Strategic Issues in One-to-One Matching with Externalities

Cites Work

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• Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
• Stable one-to-one matchings with externalities
• Stability and Preference Alignment in Matching and Coalition Formation
• Beauty Is a Beast, Frog Is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities
• A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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