Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: a topological approach
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Publication:2222218
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.09.005zbMath1457.91271OpenAlexW3090166707MaRDI QIDQ2222218
Publication date: 26 January 2021
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.09.005
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