Stability and incentives for college admissions with budget constraints

DOI10.3982/TE1731MaRDI QIDQ4586050zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Azar Abizada

Publication date 11 September 2018

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te1731

zbMATH Keywords

budget constraintpairwise stabilityPareto-undominatedstrategy-proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

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(17)

• An allocation method of provincial college enrollment plan based on bankruptcy model
• Limited choice in college admissions: an experimental study
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• Strategic issues in college admissions with score-limits
• A college admissions clearinghouse
• Graduate admission with financial support
• College admissions with tuition transfers
• Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: evidence from China's college admissions
• Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: a topological approach
• College curriculum, diverging selectivity, and enrollment expansion
• Patience is a virtue: the effect of slack on competitiveness for admission control
• Strategyproof mechanism for two-sided matching with resource allocation
• Financial aid in college admissions: need-based versus merit-based
• Efficient matching under general constraints
• Dorm augmented college assignments
• College admissions with budget complementarities
• Need-blind college admissions, financial aid and student loan programs

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