The College Admissions Problem Revisited
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Recommendations
- The college admissions problem with lower and common quotas
- Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
- A further note on the college admission game
- Random matching in the college admissions problem
- Student portfolios and the college admissions problem
- Strategic issues in college admissions with score-limits
- Paths to stability for college admissions with budget constraints
- Stability and strategy-proofness for college admissions with an eligibility criterion
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem
Cited in
(49)- Entering classes in the college admissions model
- Minimal envy and popular matchings
- Graduate admission with financial support
- Characterizations of the optimal stable allocation mechanism
- On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets
- Deferred acceptance algorithm with retrade
- A coloring property for stable allocations
- Dynamic resource matching in manufacturing using deep reinforcement learning
- Many-to-one matchings without substitutability
- The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the national resident matching program (NRMP)
- The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules
- A college admissions clearinghouse
- The law of aggregate demand and welfare in the two-sided matching market
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- Implementation of the core in college admissions problems when colleagues matter
- College admissions with ties and common quotas: integer programming approach
- Smith and Rawls share a room: stability and medians
- On the stable b-matching polytope.
- Stable schedule matching under revealed preference.
- Stable-matching Voronoi diagrams: combinatorial complexity and algorithms
- Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests
- Some remarks on the modeling of discrete matching markets
- Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods.
- Learning to match via inverse optimal transport
- Mutually best matches
- Limited choice in college admissions: an experimental study
- Paths to stability for college admissions with budget constraints
- Two-Sided Matching Models
- Strategic issues in college admissions with score-limits
- Balancing stability and efficiency in team formation as a generalized roommate problem
- A binomial decision tree to manage <scp>yield‐uncertainty</scp> in <scp>multi‐round</scp> academic admissions processes
- Singleton core in many-to-one matching problems
- Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
- Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings
- On Marilda Sotomayor's extraordinary contribution to matching theory
- Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor
- Stable matchings and the small core in Nash equilibrium in the college admissions problem.
- Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
- Social coordination and network formation in bipartite networks
- A unified approach to finding good stable matchings in the hospitals/residents setting
- Median stable matching for college admissions
- College curriculum, diverging selectivity, and enrollment expansion
- Stability Representations of Many-to-One Matching Problems: An Integer Optimization Approach
- Stability and incentives for college admissions with budget constraints
- Financial aid in college admissions: need-based versus merit-based
- A further note on the college admission game
- Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
- Decision-making with reference information
- Equivalences between two matching models: stability
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