Two-Sided Matching Models

DOI10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_572MaRDI QIDQ5150290zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Marilda Sotomayor, Ömer Özak

Publication date 15 February 2021

Published in Complex Social and Behavioral Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_572

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative and noncooperative approachestwo-sided matching models

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites work

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• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
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• Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes

Cited in

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• On the <formula formulatype="inline"><tex Notation="TeX">$H^{2}$</tex> </formula> Two-Sided Model Matching Problem With Preview

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