Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets
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Cites work
Cited in
(78)- Stable marriages by coroutines
- A probabilistic version of the stable marriage problem
- Optimum allocation of places to students in a national university system
- Worst-case choice for the stable marriage problem
- The average performance of a parallel stable mariage algorithm
- Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
- ``Timing is everything and marital bliss
- Lone wolves in infinite, discrete matching markets
- Strategy-proofness of worker-optimal matching with continuously transferable utility
- Gender consistent resolving rules in marriage problems
- Antimatroids induced by matchings
- Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets
- On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
- Stable matchings and preferences of couples
- Courtship and linear programming
- Paths to marriage stability
- Canonical monotone decompositions of fractional stable matchings
- Sisterhood in the Gale-Shapley matching algorithm
- Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
- A polynomial-time algorithm to find von Neumann-Morgenstern stable matchings in marriage games
- Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm
- An improved bound to manipulation in large stable matches
- Stable matchings in the marriage model with indifferences
- Saturating stable matchings
- Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets
- Bipartite choices
- Decentralized matching at senior-level: stability and incentives
- Lone wolves in competitive equilibria
- Perfect graphs with polynomially computable kernels
- A characterization of strongly stable fractional matchings
- On the contracts between doctors and rural hospitals
- Absorbing sets in roommate problems
- A stable matching model with an entrance criterion applied to the assignment of students to dormitories at the Technion
- The dynamics of stable matchings and half-matchings for the stable marriage and roommates problems
- Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
- Incentives in decentralized random matching markets
- The graphs of stably matchable pairs
- The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings
- Enrollment manipulations in school choice
- Marriage market with indifferences: a linear programming approach
- Preference swaps for the stable matching problem
- Stable solutions on matching models with quota restriction
- A new algorithm for stable assignments
- Employment by lotto revisited
- The stability of marriage and university admissions—zero-one programming method
- Optimal truncation in matching markets
- An extendable stable matching algorithm of a kind of bipartite graph
- Two-Sided Matching Models
- Polyhedral aspects of stable marriage
- Decentralized job matching
- Incentive compatibility for the stable matching model with an entrance criterion
- Solving coloring, minimum clique cover and kernel problems on arc intersection graphs of directed paths on a tree
- Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets
- An analysis of the stable marriage assignment algorithm
- Dynamically stable matching
- Online 2-stage stable matching
- On the set of stable matchings in a bipartite graph
- A simple matching domain with indifferences and a master list
- The Pareto-stability concept is a natural solution concept for discrete matching markets with indifferences
- A theory of fair random allocation under priorities
- Finding all stable matchings with assignment constraints
- Choice or competition: does integration benefit everyone?
- When do reforms meet fairness concerns in school admissions?
- Abundant neighborhoods, two-sided markets, and maximal matchings
- Lone wolves just got lonelier
- A note on the characterization of stable matchings for general preferences: a fixed point approach
- Consistent conjectures in dynamic matching markets
- In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm
- Smith and Rawls share a room: stability and medians
- Tiered random matching markets: rank is proportional to popularity
- Dynamic matching games: stationary equilibria under varying commitments
- Welfare effects of integrating unbalanced matching markets
- A parallel algorithm to solve the stable marriage problem
- Finding all stable matchings with couples
- Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor
- The college admissions problem with lower and common quotas
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