Finding all stable matchings with assignment constraints
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Cites work
- An algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings.
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Corrigendum to ``stable matchings and preferences of couples
- Cycles to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings
- Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
- Deferred acceptance with compensation chains
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 45086 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 958014 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
- Kernels in perfect line-graphs
- Many-to-One Stable Matching: Geometry and Fairness
- Median stable matching for college admissions
- Median stable matchings in two-sided markets
- Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
- Of Stable Marriages and Graphs, and Strategy and Polytopes
- Quantile stable mechanisms
- Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
- School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
- Some remarks on the stable matching problem
- Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets
- Stable matchings and preferences of couples
- The Complexity of Counting Stable Marriages
- The geometry of fractional stable matchings and its applications
- The stable marriage problem with restricted pairs.
- Three Fast Algorithms for Four Problems in Stable Marriage
- Understanding the generalized median stable matchings
- Unique stable matchings
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