Many-to-One Stable Matching: Geometry and Fairness

DOI10.1287/MOOR.1060.0207MaRDI QIDQ5387998zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jay Sethuraman, Chung-Piaw Teo, Liwen Qian

Publication date 27 May 2008

Published in Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1060.0207

zbMATH Keywords

fairnesslinear programmingmatching with couplesrandomized roundingstable matchingtwo-sided marketuniversity admissions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Linear programming (90C05) Matching models (91B68)

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Cited in

(32)

• The stable b-matching polytope revisited
• Understanding the generalized median stable matchings
• The stable roommates problem with choice functions
• Deferred acceptance is minimally manipulable
• On the set of many-to-one strongly stable fractional matchings
• Quantile stable mechanisms
• Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets
• Preference aggregation for couples
• A note on the lattice structure for matching markets via linear programming
• Matching with preferences over colleagues solves classical matching
• What price stability? Social welfare in matching markets
• Median stable matching for college admissions
• Blockers and antiblockers of stable matchings
• The geometry of fractional stable matchings and its applications
• Matching with couples: a multidisciplinary survey
• Median stable matchings in two-sided markets
• Matching couples with Scarf's algorithm
• Integer programming methods for special college admissions problems
• The Stable Roommates Problem with Choice Functions
• Fractional matching markets
• Finding a Level Ideal of a Poset
• Median stable matching for markets with wages
• Stable matching: An integer programming approach
• Integer programming methods to identify Nash equilibrium solutions for platform-based scheduling games
• Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching
• A fair procedure in a marriage market
• Finding all stable matchings with assignment constraints
• Tâtonnement in matching markets
• Dynamic resource matching in manufacturing using deep reinforcement learning
• Smith and Rawls share a room: stability and medians
• Friend of my friend: network formation with two-hop benefit
• A unified approach to finding good stable matchings in the hospitals/residents setting

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