On the set of many-to-one strongly stable fractional matchings

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2020.12.002zbMATH Open1461.91200OpenAlexW3121083186MaRDI QIDQ2019364FDOQ2019364

Authors Pablo Neme, Jorge Oviedo 

Publication date 26 April 2021

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.12500

zbMATH Keywords

matching marketsmany-to-one matching marketstrongly stable fractional matchings

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Abstract: For a many-to-one matching market where firms have strict and $$-responsive preferences, we give a characterization of the set of strongly stable fractional matchings as the union of the convex hull of all connected sets of stable matchings. Also, we prove that a strongly stable fractional matching is represented as a convex combination of stable matchings that are ordered in the common preferences of all firms.

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Cited in

(3)

• A characterization of strongly stable fractional matchings
• Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets
• von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching

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