Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.03.007zbMath1166.91014OpenAlexW3122349304MaRDI QIDQ1030169

Bettina Klaus, Markus Walzl

Publication date: 1 July 2009

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/1555032/guid-71cdb3e4-d437-48e3-8d32-e6ecc3388179-ASSET1.0.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

many-to-many matchingpairwise stabilitymatching with contractssetwise stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

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Cites Work

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• Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts
• Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
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• Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems
• Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
• The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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