Vacancies in supply chain networks

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2013.02.004zbMath1283.91106OpenAlexW2057959139MaRDI QIDQ2439809

John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers

Publication date: 17 March 2014

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.02.004

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitymatchingnetworksvacancy chains

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Inventory, storage, reservoirs (90B05) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (2)

The substitutes condition and the lattice structure of the set of stable allocations ⋮ Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
• Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts
• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
• Entry and structures of interest groups in assignment games
• Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
• The Network Origins of Aggregate Fluctuations
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes

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