Stable schedule matchings

DOI10.1007/S10474-011-0165-4MaRDI QIDQ2454577zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors V. Komornik, Zsolt Komornik, Christelle Viauroux

Publication date 13 June 2014

Published in Acta Mathematica Hungarica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1005.2078

zbMATH Keywords

stable matchingchoice functionschedule matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Combinatorial optimization (90C27) Matching models (91B68)

Abstract: We generalize several schedule matching theorems of Baiou-Balinski (Math. Oper. Res., 27 (2002), 485) and Alkan-Gale (J. Econ. Th. 112 (2003), 289) by applying a fixed point method of Fleiner (Math. Oper. Res., 28 (2003), 103). Thanks to a more general construction of revealing choice maps we develop an algorithm to solve rather complex matching problems. The flexibility and efficiency of our approach is illustrated by various examples. We also revisit the mathematical structure of the matching theory by comparing various definitions of stable sets and various classes of choice maps. We demonstrate, by several examples, that the revealing property of the choice maps is the most suitable one to ensure the existence of stable matchings; both from the theoretical and the practical point of view.

Recommendations

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1757951 (Why is no real title available?)
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Cited in

(4)

• Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems
• Stable schedule matching under revealed preference
• Stable schedule matching under revealed preference.
• Choice functions on posets

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