Stable schedule matchings

DOI10.1007/S10474-011-0165-4zbMATH Open1299.91097arXiv1005.2078OpenAlexW2022720792MaRDI QIDQ2454577FDOQ2454577

Authors: V. Komornik, Zsolt Komornik, Christelle Viauroux 

Publication date: 13 June 2014

Published in: Acta Mathematica Hungarica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: We generalize several schedule matching theorems of Baiou-Balinski (Math. Oper. Res., 27 (2002), 485) and Alkan-Gale (J. Econ. Th. 112 (2003), 289) by applying a fixed point method of Fleiner (Math. Oper. Res., 28 (2003), 103). Thanks to a more general construction of revealing choice maps we develop an algorithm to solve rather complex matching problems. The flexibility and efficiency of our approach is illustrated by various examples. We also revisit the mathematical structure of the matching theory by comparing various definitions of stable sets and various classes of choice maps. We demonstrate, by several examples, that the revealing property of the choice maps is the most suitable one to ensure the existence of stable matchings; both from the theoretical and the practical point of view.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1005.2078

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zbMATH Keywords

stable matchingchoice functionschedule matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Combinatorial optimization (90C27) Matching models (91B68)

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Cited In (4)

• Stable schedule matching under revealed preference
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• Choice functions on posets
• Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems

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