On cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game: limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.09.016zbMATH Open1309.91012OpenAlexW2122325130MaRDI QIDQ472191FDOQ472191
Authors: Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme 
Publication date: 19 November 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11336/5802
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Cites Work
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- On the core of linear production games
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- A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy
- Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
- Connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple-partners assignment game
- Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts
- The epsilon core of a large replica game
- The lattice structure of the set of stable outcomes of the multiple partners assignment game
- Cores of partitioning games
- The multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria
- Cores of many-player games; nonemptiness and equal treatment
- Equivalence of Games and Markets
- A generalized assignment game
Cited In (10)
- A limit theorem for the core of Betrand oligopoly games with externalities
- Limit theorems for recursive delegation equilibria
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- The equilibrium-value convergence for the multiple-partners game
- Cooperative assignment games with the inverse Monge property
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A note on submodularity preserved involving the rank functions
- A survey on assignment markets
- Shapley's conjecture on the cores of abstract market games
- On the structure of cooperative and competitive solutions for a generalized assignment game
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