On cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game: limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.09.016MaRDI QIDQ472191zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme

Publication date 19 November 2014

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/11336/5802

zbMATH Keywords

assignment gamecompetitive equilibriumcoreset-wise stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Discrete location and assignment (90B80) Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

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Cites work

• A generalized assignment game
• A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy
• Connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple-partners assignment game
• Cores of many-player games; nonemptiness and equal treatment
• Cores of partitioning games
• Equivalence of Games and Markets
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3177183 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3006370 (Why is no real title available?)
• On the core of linear production games
• Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts
• The assignment game. I: The core
• The epsilon core of a large replica game
• The lattice structure of the set of stable outcomes of the multiple partners assignment game
• The multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria
• Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem

Cited in

(12)

• Shapley's conjecture on the cores of abstract market games
• Competition and cooperation in a two-sided matching market with replication
• A note on submodularity preserved involving the rank functions
• A limit theorem for the core of Betrand oligopoly games with externalities
• On the structure of cooperative and competitive solutions for a generalized assignment game
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3883888 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 613179 (Why is no real title available?)
• Generalized three-sided assignment markets: core consistency and competitive prices
• Limit theorems for recursive delegation equilibria
• The equilibrium-value convergence for the multiple-partners game
• Cooperative assignment games with the inverse Monge property
• A survey on assignment markets

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