Limit theorems for recursive delegation equilibria
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Publication:6156327
DOI10.1007/S10058-022-00323-5zbMATH Open1518.91128WikidataQ121617727 ScholiaQ121617727MaRDI QIDQ6156327FDOQ6156327
Authors: Semih Koray, Murat R. Sertel 
Publication date: 13 June 2023
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
Cited In (10)
- Delegation equilibrium payoffs in integer-splitting games
- Algorithms for recursive delegation
- Delegating decisions in strategic settings
- Community repeated interaction and strategic delegation
- Repeated delegation
- Delegation and commitment in durable goods monopolies
- Information revelation in repeated delegation
- Regular equilibria and negative welfare implications in delegation games
- Delegation principle for multi-agency games under ex post equilibrium
- Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation
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