Community repeated interaction and strategic delegation

DOI10.1007/S00182-016-0553-7MaRDI QIDQ1677249zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ottorino Chillemi, Benedetto Gui, Lorenzo Rocco

Publication date 10 November 2017

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-016-0553-7

zbMATH Keywords

delegationlocal informationdynamic agencyendogenous selection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Recommendations

• Information revelation in repeated delegation
• Limit theorems for recursive delegation equilibria
• Cooperation in Community Interaction without Information Flows
• Long-term relationships as safeguards
• Repeated delegation

Cites work

• Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
• Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication
• Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The multi-agent case
• On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting
• Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect
• The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts

Cited in

(2)

• Information revelation in repeated delegation
• Deontic Logic in Computer Science

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