Community repeated interaction and strategic delegation
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Publication:1677249
DOI10.1007/s00182-016-0553-7zbMath1415.91040OpenAlexW2531750977MaRDI QIDQ1677249
Lorenzo Rocco, Ottorino Chillemi, Benedetto Gui
Publication date: 10 November 2017
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-016-0553-7
Cites Work
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