Community repeated interaction and strategic delegation

DOI10.1007/S00182-016-0553-7zbMATH Open1415.91040OpenAlexW2531750977MaRDI QIDQ1677249FDOQ1677249

Authors: Ottorino Chillemi, Benedetto Gui, Lorenzo Rocco 

Publication date: 10 November 2017

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-016-0553-7

Recommendations

• Information revelation in repeated delegation
• Limit theorems for recursive delegation equilibria
• Cooperation in Community Interaction without Information Flows
• Long-term relationships as safeguards
• Repeated delegation

zbMATH Keywords

delegationlocal informationdynamic agencyendogenous selection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
• The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
• Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication
• On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting
• Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The multi-agent case
• Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect

Cited In (2)

• Deontic Logic in Computer Science
• Information revelation in repeated delegation

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