Cooperation in Community Interaction without Information Flows
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Publication:4887202
DOI10.2307/2297892zbMath0855.90042OpenAlexW2263269534MaRDI QIDQ4887202
Publication date: 1 August 1996
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297892
Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)
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