Limited records and reputation bubbles
From MaRDI portal
Publication:402059
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.12.014zbMath1296.91129MaRDI QIDQ402059
Andrzej Skrzypacz, Qing-Min Liu
Publication date: 27 August 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.12.014
91B99: Mathematical economics
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
Related Items
A Model of Multiproduct Firm Growth, Bounded memory folk theorem, Order of limits in reputations, Sustainable reputations with rating systems, Restricted feedback in long term relationships, Impermanent types and permanent reputations, Bounded memory and incomplete information, Cooperation dynamics in repeated games of adverse selection, Equilibrium behaviors in repeated games, Market screening with limited records, On the existence of the ex post symmetric random entry model, Disappearance of reputations in two-sided incomplete-information games, Reputation building through costly adjustment
Cites Work
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- Sustainable reputations with rating systems
- Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring
- Impermanent types and permanent reputations
- Public trust and government betrayal
- Repeated games with one-memory
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- Reputation and imperfect information
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- Repeated signaling games
- Reputation and impermanent types
- Finite memory and imperfect monitoring
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- Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
- A Theory of Credibility
- Cooperation in Community Interaction without Information Flows
- Reputation with Analogical Reasoning*
- Seller Reputation
- Bubbles and Crashes
- Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations
- Who Wants a Good Reputation?
