Market screening with limited records

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2021.12.001zbMATH Open1483.91096OpenAlexW4206166782MaRDI QIDQ2078060FDOQ2078060

Authors: Ayça Kaya, Santanu Roy 

Publication date: 25 February 2022

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.12.001

Recommendations

• Signaling in dynamic markets with adverse selection
• Limited records and reputation bubbles
• Information about sellers' past behavior in the market for lemons
• Adverse selection in dynamic matching markets
• Qualitative Uncertainty in a Market with Bilateral Trading

zbMATH Keywords

transparencyadverse selectionrepeated saleslemons marketlimited records

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Limited records and reputation bubbles
• Information acquisition and reputation dynamics
• Sustainable reputations with rating systems
• Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons
• Information about sellers' past behavior in the market for lemons
• Transparency and distressed sales under asymmetric information
• Sequences of Games with Varying Opponents
• Trading dynamics with private buyer signals in the market for lemons
• Reputation effects under interdependent values
• Community enforcement of trust with bounded memory
• Motivational ratings

Cited In (3)

• Dynamic screening with limited commitment
• Memory and markets
• Signaling in dynamic markets with adverse selection

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